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Abstract 
 
Under floating exchange rates, there is a mechanism that generates persistent current account 
imbalances at a competitively achieved steady state. Even if preferences are heterogeneous, 
sustainable heterogeneity in which all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are 
satisfied can be achieved if relatively advantaged households do not behave unilaterally. Even if 
households of a relatively advantaged country behave unilaterally, households in less 
advantaged countries can counter the unilateral behavior under floating exchange rates and 
achieve optimality even with persistent current account surpluses or deficits. The observed 
persistent current account imbalances in many countries in recent decades are shown to be 
basically consistent with the predictions of this model.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
If there is no heterogeneity across countries, their current account balances should be stationary 
and have a zero mean. However, current account balances have shown persistent large deficits 
or surpluses in many countries in recent decades.1 For example, the U.S. has shown persistent 
large current account deficits since the 1980s. Therefore, there must be some important 
persisting heterogeneity across countries, but what type of heterogeneity exists? Hervey and 
Merkel (2000) categorized commonly mentioned explanations for the U.S. current account 
deficit into three types: the consumption boom hypothesis, the safe haven hypothesis (Hervey 
and Kouparitsas, 2000), and the technological change hypothesis. They concluded that the 
technological change hypothesis (i.e., heterogeneity in productivity) is the most likely cause of 
the U.S. deficit. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007), Edwards (2005), Engel and Rogers (2006), 
and Cooper (2008) argued that the present U.S. current account deficits necessitate future 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar. These studies imply that heterogeneity in prices across countries 
is the main cause of the persistent deficit.  
 Harashima (2009b, 2009c 2010) showed that heterogeneity in preferences can 
generate persistent current account imbalances at steady state and on a balanced growth path. 
When the representative households across countries are heterogeneous in the rate of time 
preference (RTP) or the degree of risk aversion (DRA), there is a state in which all optimality 
conditions of the representative households in all countries are satisfied. This state is called 
“sustainable heterogeneity.” Under sustainable heterogeneity, the current account balances of 
countries with relatively less patient or risk averse households (i.e., those with a lower RTP or 
DRA) show persistent deficits at steady state and on a balanced growth path and vice versa. An 
important nature of heterogeneity in preferences is that preferences generally persist although 
they may occasionally change; thus, heterogeneity in preferences may cause persistent current 
account deficits/surpluses. 
 However, sustainable heterogeneity is not necessarily naturally achieved. If relatively 
more advantaged households behave unilaterally, it is not achieved under fixed exchange rates 
unless an authority forces them not to behave unilaterally. Therefore, the question arises, can 
sustainable heterogeneity be achieved internationally even if a supranational authority does not 
exist? Because there is actually no supranational authority that has a right to impose taxes on 
some countries and distribute the revenues to other countries, international sustainable 
heterogeneity may depend mostly on the generosity of households of relatively more 
advantaged countries.  
 In this paper, I present a model in which there is a mechanism that achieves 
international sustainable heterogeneity even when households of relatively more advantaged 
countries behave unilaterally if exchange rates are allowed to float. With floating exchange rates, 
prices of products can change differently across countries. In contrast, prices of products change 
equally within a country (if various minor local divergences are ignored) because the currency is 
identical within a given country. The key point is that countries have different and independent 
currencies. If households in a relatively less advantaged country can exploit their currency’s 
independence, they may be able to counter the unilateral behavior of the households of a 
relatively more advantaged country. In addition, I discuss examples of current account deficits 
or surpluses in several countries and regions relative to the model’s predictions.  
 
2  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
                                                          
1 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx 
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2.1  Multilateral balanced growth 
2.1.1  Sustainable heterogeneity 
Three heterogeneities in preferences are examined―heterogeneous RTP, DRA, and 
productivity that indicates total factor productivity excluding technology (see Section A1.2.3 in 
Appendix A). The model presented in Harashima (2010) is used; it is shown in the Appendix. 
Suppose that there are  NH   countries that are identical except for the RTP, DRA, or 
productivity of the representative household of each country. The representative household is 
also the representative laborer who is one of factors that determine productivity of a country. 
The population growth rate is zero in all countries. The countries are fully open to each other, 
and goods, services, and capital are freely transacted among them, but labor is immobilized in 
each country. The countries use different currencies.  
 The model indicates that if and only if  
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for any country i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous countries’ 
representative households are satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j) where ci,t, ki,t, and yi,t are per capita consumption, capital, and output of 
country i in period t, respectively; θi, εi, and ωi are RTP, DRA, and productivity of country i, 
respectively; At is technology in period t; and α, m, v, and are constants. In addition, tjiτ ,,  is 
the current account balance of country i with country j. Equation (1) is identical to equation 
(A33) in the Appendix. The state satisfying this condition is called “sustainable heterogeneity.”  
 Note that the concept of heterogeneity in RTP is relevant to sustainable heterogeneity 
in both exogenous technology and endogenous growth models, whereas heterogeneity in DRA 
and productivity is irrelevant to sustainable heterogeneity in exogenous technology models (see 
Harashima, 2010).  
 
2.1.2  Balance of payments of heterogeneous countries 
Suppose for simplicity that there are only two countries―country 1 and country 2—that are 
identical except for RTP, DRA, or productivity. This type of two-country model can be easily 
extended to a multi-country model, and the essential results are identical in both two- and 
multi-country models (see Harashima, 2010).  
 
2.1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference 
Suppose that the RTP of the representative household of country 1 is lower than that of country 
2 (i.e., θ1 < θ2), and the other elements are identical between the two countries. The model 
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where 
tτ  is the current account balance in country 1 in period t; thus, the current account 
balance in country 2 is 
tτ  (see Section A2.4.1 in the Appendix). In addition, if 
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indicates that the current account of country 1 shows persistent deficits and that of country 2 
shows persistent surpluses if sustainable heterogeneity holds. The condition 
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2.1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion 
Suppose that countries 1 and 2 are identical except for the DRA of the representative household 
such that ε1 < ε2. The model indicates that  
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for this heterogeneity in DRA (see Section A2.4.2 in the Appendix). In addition, if 
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parameter values.  
 
2.1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity 
Suppose that countries 1 and 2 are identical except for the productivity of the representative 
household (laborer) such that ω1 < ω2. Unlike the cases of heterogeneity in RTP and DRA, 
sustainable heterogeneity can be achieved even if country 1 behaves unilaterally. Therefore, the 
balance of payments in the case of heterogeneity in productivity is different from those of RTP 
and DRA. The model indicates that if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, either 0lim 

t
t
τ  
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  (see Section 
A2.4.3 in the Appendix). On the former path, 0Ξ  and heterogeneous productivity does not 
result in permanent trade imbalances. However, on the latter path, trade imbalances usually 
grow at a higher rate than consumption. Hence, the latter path will generally not be selected (see 
Section A2.4.3 in the Appendix). In addition, country 1 will not prefer to behave unilaterally in 
this case (see Section A3.3 in the Appendix). Hence, in the case of heterogeneity in productivity, 
the current accounts of both countries 1 and 2 will generally be balanced.  
 
2.2  Unilateral balanced growth  
Sustainable heterogeneity is not naturally achieved. Whether it is achieved depends on the 
behavior of relatively more advantaged countries (see Section A3 in the Appendix). If they 
behave unilaterally without considering the optimality of relatively less advantaged countries, 
sustainable heterogeneity is not achieved.  
 In the two-country model of heterogeneous RTP (θ1 < θ2), all the optimality conditions 
of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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(see Section A3.1 in the Appendix). Equations (2) and (3) are identical to equations (A36) and 
(A37) in the Appendix, respectively. Equations (2) and (3) indicate that country 1 has two paths 
on which all of its optimality conditions are satisfied. On the other hand, country 2 can achieve 
optimality only when country 1 chooses the path of equation (2). Equation (2) corresponds to 
sustainable heterogeneity. If country 1 chooses the path of equation (3), that is, behaves 
unilaterally without considering the optimality of country 2, however, country 2 cannot achieve 
optimality. Country 2 will eventually lose ownership of all capital, and the state shown by 
Becker (1980) will be observed. 
 The same result is obtained for heterogeneity in DRA (ε1 < ε2) (see Section A3.2 in the 
Appendix). Country 1 has two paths for optimality, but country 2 has only one path of 
sustainable heterogeneity for optimality. However, heterogeneity in productivity can be 
sustainable for country 2 even if country 1 behaves unilaterally (see Section A3.3 in the 
Appendix).  
 
3  CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES  
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As with Section 2, suppose for simplicity that there are only two countries that are identical 
except for RTP or DRA such that θ1 < θ2 or ε1 < ε2. Heterogeneity in productivity can be ignored 
because it is generally irrelevant to current account imbalances as shown in Section 2.1.2.3. It is 
assumed for simplicity that there is no overall inflation or deflation in both countries. 
Nevertheless, changes in relative prices across goods and services can occur within a country. In 
addition, the two countries use different currencies. 
 As shown in Section 2.1.2, 0lim
0

t
s
t
ds is impossible to satisfy at steady state and 
on a balanced growth path because of heterogeneity in RTP or DRA. Therefore, even if 
sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, 0lim
0

t
s
t
ds and persistent current account 
imbalances must exist.  
 
3.1  Current account balances under a fixed exchange rate 
An important point of fixed exchange rates is that if country 1 behaves unilaterally, households 
of country 2 have no tool to counter the unilateral behavior of country 1. Therefore, sustainable 
heterogeneity cannot be achieved because country 2 cannot achieve optimality and has to 
experience accelerating current account deficits as discussed in Section 2. In this circumstance, 
households of country 2 can only hope that households of country 1 do not behave unilaterally 
or that some outside authority prohibits households of country 1 from behaving unilaterally, e.g., 
through various regulations.  
 
3.2  Current account balances under floating exchange rates 
3.2.1  The countermeasure 
If the exchange rate floats, however, households of country 2 have a tool to achieve optimality. 
The countermeasure consists of the following two pillars:  
 
(a) reduce the overall level of consumption from the initially expected (planned) level, and 
(b) reduce the level of consumption of products imported from country 1 from the initially 
expected (planned) level.  
 
Implementing the countermeasure means that demands of country 2’s households are 
deliberately (or “strategically”) reduced relative to their preferred levels; that is, the households 
deliberately deviate from the consumption path that is consistent with the Euler equation 
calculated based on their preferences. Pillar (2) may be seen as a type of “patriotic” behavior, 
for example, the concept behind “Buy American.” The question arises, however, is this behavior 
rational? This behavior is in fact quite rational because the only alternative is that country 2’s 
households can never achieve optimality if country 1’s households behave unilaterally. In other 
words, rationality requires the households of country 2 to not follow their own preferences.  
 In economics, rationality usually means that, given the available information, optimal 
decisions are made to achieve an objective (i.e., achieve optimality). In this case, because of the 
unilateral behavior of country 1’s households, households of country 2 are placed in a situation 
where, to achieve optimality, they have to deviate from their preferred path. Deciding to use the 
countermeasure therefore indicates that preference (i.e., RTP or DRA) succumbs to rationality 
when the two conflict.   
 
3.2.2  Depreciating the currency of country 2 
Assume for simplicity that both countries produce only one type of product, the quality of which 
is identical. The two countries are completely open and products of the two countries are freely 
transacted and sold in both countries (i.e., identical products are imported and exported to and 
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from each country). Suppose that households of country 1 choose a unilateral path for their 
expected stream of floating exchange rate. Households in country 2 will therefore have to 
deviate from their preferences to survive.  
 
3.2.2.1  The countermeasure under a fixed exchange rate  
First, I examine the use of the countermeasure under a fixed exchange rate for the sake of 
comparison with that under a floating exchange rate. Let c*t be the amount of reduction in 
country 2’s consumption of country 1’s products in period t because of the countermeasure. 
Because of the second pillar of the countermeasure, a part of country 1’s products that would be 
exported to country 2 (i.e., c*t) is not purchased by country 2. Firms of country 1 are aware of 
pillar (2) of the countermeasure; thus, they instead sell c*t in their home country. Country 1’s 
households will purchase these products because prices in both countries are unchanged under a 
fixed exchange rate. Country 1’s households therefore replace the consumption of products 
imported from country 2 with that of their own country by c*t. Because of this simple 
replacement, the level of consumption and formation of capital in country 1 is unchanged from 
the initially expected path.  
 In country 2, exports decrease by c*t because of the replacement of consumption by the 
households of country 1, and c*t becomes dead stock for country 2’s firms. A part of c*t may be 
consumed by country 2’s households, but this additional consumption is merely replaced by 
other dead stock because the overall level of consumption is being reduced according to pillar 
(1) of the countermeasure. Therefore, firms of country 2 have to possess dead stock under a 
fixed exchange rate, and country 2 has no power to counter the unilateral behavior of country 1.  
 
3.2.2.2  The countermeasure under floating exchange rates  
An essential difference between the case with a fixed exchange rate and that of floating rates is 
that prices (i.e., the exchange rate in this case) can decrease if excess supply exists. By the same 
reasoning as in the case of a fixed exchange rate, firms of country 2 have to possess dead stock 
because of the countermeasure. However, if the currency of country 2 depreciates, the dead 
stock can be sold in country 1 at a cheaper price in the currency of country 1 without lowering 
the price in the currency of country 2. As a result of the cheaper prices, households of country 1 
will not replace the consumption of country 2’s products with that of their own country’s 
products. If the currency of country 2 depreciates, therefore, firms of country 2 can eliminate the 
dead stock. Taking this into consideration, firms of country 2 will agree to export the dead stock 
to country 1 at the depreciated exchange rate even though the revenue from the sales in country 
1 will be lower in the currency of country 2. Arbitrators in foreign currency exchange markets 
know firms in country 2 will take this action and thus will buy and sell both countries’ 
currencies at the depreciated exchange rate. Other market participants also are aware of the 
behaviors of country 2’s firms and arbitrators, and thus their expectations of the future exchange 
rate are modified to the depreciated rate as compared with the initially expected exchange rate. 
As a result, under floating exchange rates, a force to depreciate the currency of country 2 is 
naturally generated by the countermeasure.  
 Note that if the currency of country 2 is expected to depreciate, investors of country 1 
will not invest in capital in country 2 unless the yield on investment in country 2 evaluated in 
country 1’s currency exceeds that evaluated in country 2’s currency plus the expected rate of 
depreciation of country 2’s currency. Hence, investments by firms of country 1 will not be 
implemented as initially expected before the countermeasure was taken.  
 There is another type of countermeasure that has the same effect as the 
countermeasure discussed, and it may be implementable even under a fixed exchange rate. It has 
been assumed hitherto that there is no overall inflation or deflation in both countries. However, 
if country 2 can manage to reduce its overall inflation rate (e.g., produce deflation), the currency 
of country 2 in essence depreciates even under a fixed exchange rate. However, households of 
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country 2 cannot manipulate overall inflation or deflation by themselves. Therefore, this type of 
countermeasure will not be implementable by households alone. A central bank and government 
may, however, use this countermeasure, for example, by deliberately contracting domestic 
demand by raising nominal interest rates under a fixed exchange rate.  
 
3.2.3  The balanced growth path 
The depreciation of country 2’s currency makes the initially expected future economic path of 
country 1 impossible to actualize because country 1 cannot satisfy equation (3), which is an 
optimality condition when country 1 behaves unilaterally. Because 
t
sds
0
  evaluated in the 
currency of country 1 does not accumulate as initially planned because of the depreciation, 
equation (3) cannot be achieved; that is, the following inequality 
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that is evaluated in the currency of country 1, is always satisfied. 
 Faced with the country 2’s countermeasure, households of country 1 may adjust their 
consumption plan to achieve unilateral optimality again by resetting their initial level of 
consumption to a lower level. However, households of country 2 will then reset their own initial 
level of consumption. As a result, if country 2 remains determined to continue to strengthen the 
countermeasure as long as country 1 behaves unilaterally, households of country 1 can never 
achieve unilateral optimality under floating exchange rates. To achieve optimality, households 
of country 1 have to renounce their unilateral behavior and agree to follow the path of 
sustainable heterogeneity. Unlike the case of a fixed exchange rate, therefore, the 
countermeasure is very effective under floating exchange rates and sustainable heterogeneity is 
naturally achieved.  
 
4  DISCUSSION 
 
Sustainable heterogeneity is competitively achieved at steady state and a balanced growth path 
under floating exchange rates also in multi-country models because, if a country behaves 
unilaterally, its currency is forced to appreciate by the same mechanism shown in Section 3 for 
a two-country model. However, international sustainable heterogeneity may not be clearly 
observed in the current account balances of many developing countries because generally they 
are not perfectly under floating exchange rates. In addition, many strict regulations in financial 
and other markets exist in these countries. In developed countries, however, the effect of 
international sustainable heterogeneity can be clearly observed.   
 
4.1  Persistent current account deficits in the U.S. 
Before the floating exchange rate system was introduced for the U.S. dollar (i.e., before the 
mid-1970s), the U.S. current account balance generally showed surpluses, although the surplus 
to GDP ratios were very small compared with the current account deficit to GDP ratio at present. 
After floating exchange rates were introduced, U.S. current account balances have continued to 
show large deficits. This trend is quite consistent with what the model discussed in Section 2 
and the mechanism shown in Section 3 predict.  
 RTP has been observed to be negatively correlated to incomes (e.g., Lawrance, 1991); 
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thus, it is highly likely that RTP is negatively correlated to productivity. The U.S. has one of the 
highest productivities in the world, and it is therefore likely that its RTP is one of the lowest. 
Hence, the RTP of the U.S. will be lower than the RTPs of many of its trade partners. The 
model therefore predicts that the U.S. will experience large current account deficits because 
sustainable heterogeneity is the competitively achieved steady state (or balanced growth path) 
under floating exchange rates. In addition, it is highly likely that the DRA of the U.S. is lower 
than that of Japan, which is one of major trade partners of the U.S. (see Harashima, 2009c). 
Because of the difference in the DRA between the two countries, the model predicts that the U.S. 
will experience large current account deficits with Japan, which have in fact been observed.  
 The observed persistent large current account deficits of the U.S. are therefore a 
natural consequence of its low RTP relative to its many trade partners and low DRA to Japan 
under floating exchange rates. The deficits are justifiable, normal, and sustainable because 
international sustainable heterogeneity is achieved.   
 The U.K., Canada, and Australia have also generally experienced current account 
deficits since the 1980s. The economic and cultural characteristics of these countries are very 
similar to those of the U.S. Hence, it is likely that they also have similar preferences and levels 
of productivity. The persistent current account deficits observed in these countries are therefore 
also consistent with the model’s predictions.  
 According to the model, the current account surpluses to GDP ratios of the U.S. before 
the floating exchange rate system was introduced should have been much larger than those that 
were actually observed in the 1950s and 1960s because sustainable heterogeneity would not 
hold. During that period, U.S. households may not have behaved strictly unilaterally, but a more 
likely reason for the smaller than predicted surpluses is that international trade and finance were 
strictly regulated by governments and thus current account balances were biased in many 
countries during that period. In addition, domestic financial markets were also strictly regulated. 
Since the 1970s, however, many of those regulations have been lifted in most developed 
countries.  
 
4.2  Persistent current account surpluses of the eurozone 
The overall current account balance of the Eurozone countries has shown surpluses except a few 
years after the creation of euro and a few years after the global financial crisis of 2008. Recently, 
surpluses have markedly increased. The eurozone consists of countries with various kinds of 
traditions, cultures, and levels of productivity. It includes some of the highest productivity 
countries in the world as well as some countries with relatively lower levels of productivity. The 
average productivity of the eurozone therefore is lower than that of the U.S.; thus, the average 
RTP of households in the eurozone will be higher than that of U.S. households. Hence, the 
observed current account surpluses of the eurozone are consistent with the predictions of the 
model discussed in Section 2 and the mechanism in Section 3. In this respect, persistent 
surpluses in the eurozone are not necessarily unjustifiable but may be a natural and normal 
consequence of its relatively higher RTP as compared with that of the U.S.  
 Note that three non-eurozone Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, and Demark) are 
some of the wealthiest countries and thus likely to have the highest productivity in the world. 
Therefore, they are likely to have the lowest RTP in the world, but they all have experienced 
large current account surpluses since the late 1990s. These surpluses appear to be inconsistent 
with the model’s predictions. However, it is likely that these surpluses were affected by 
Norway’s large increases in oil exports since the late 1990s. Oil exports consist of more than 
half of Norway’s exports, and Norway is the major trade partner of neighboring Sweden and 
Demark. Because of this oil factor, the effect the model predicts may be unclear in the current 
account balances of these countries.  
 
4.3  Persistent current account deficits of Greece 
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If a country is a member state of a monetary union, the countermeasure is meaningless within 
the union because being a member of a monetary union indicates that there is no exchange rate 
within the union. If relatively more advantaged member states (i.e., those with relatively lower 
RTP or DRA) behave unilaterally, sustainable heterogeneity within a monetary union is 
impossible.  
 Greece is a part of the eurozone, but its productivity will be lower than average in the 
Eurozone from data on GDP per capita; thus, it is highly likely that its RTP is higher than the 
average. Therefore, Greece is one of relatively less advantaged member states in the eurozone. 
If relatively more advantaged member states behave unilaterally, Greece will experience large 
current account deficits and eventually fall into a situation where all capital is owned by 
relatively more advantaged member states, as Becker (1980) discussed. The observed persistent 
large current account deficits of Greece since the euro’s creation are consistent with the model 
predictions. The deficits of Greece therefore should be judged as unjustifiable imbalances 
resulting from the unilateral behavior of households in relatively more advantaged member 
states.  
 The persistent current account deficits of Greece signify the inadequacy of the 
countermeasure discussed in this paper in a euro-like monetary union. To achieve sustainable 
heterogeneity within a monetary union, some additional mechanism is needed, for example, 
systematic fiscal transfers from more advantaged member states to less advantaged ones.  
 Harashima (2011, 2015) showed another source of imbalances within member states 
of the eurozone. Because the European central bank cannot separately control the behaviors of 
each of the member states’ governments, inflation differentials and current account imbalances 
are generated. Unless a proper mechanism of fiscal transfers among member states is introduced, 
the economies of relatively less advantaged states are eventually devastated. Therefore, Greece 
is suffering from the two unilateral behaviors. One is the unilateral behavior of households of 
relatively more advantaged member states (by the mechanism shown in this paper), and the 
other is the unilateral behavior of governments of relatively more advantaged member states 
that refuse to introduce a systematic fiscal transfer mechanism.  
 
4.4  Persistent current account surpluses of Japan 
Japan has experienced persistent and large current account surpluses since the 1980s. As 
discussed in Section 4.1, the average DRA of the Japanese is considerably higher than that of 
people in the U.S and many other countries (see Harashima, 2009c). Because of this, the model 
predicts that, under floating exchange rates, Japan will experience persistent large current 
account surpluses (see also Harashima, 2009c). On the other hand, the RTP of Japan may be 
almost as low as that of the U. S. The low RTP means that Japan may experience persistent 
large current account deficits like the U.S. The observed persistent large current account 
surpluses imply that the effect of the high DRA is much larger than that of the low RTP.  
 
4.5  Persistent current account surpluses of China 
China’s current account balances have shown large surpluses since the 1990s. China’s 
productivity is clearly lower than those of most developed countries from data on GDP per 
capita. Therefore, China’s RTP will be higher than those of most developed countries. The 
model indicates that, if households of China use the countermeasure, persistent large current 
account surpluses will be observed (see also Harashima, 2009b). However, unlike the U.S., 
countries in the eurozone, Japan, and other developed countries, it may be difficult to simply 
apply the model to the current account balance of China because it is markedly different from 
these developed countries in several important aspects: (1) China has a socialist market 
economy, (2) it is a developing country, and (3) it is a non-democratic country. 
 With these unique features, the persistent and large current account surpluses of China 
may be generated by different mechanisms from the one the model describes. First, China’s 
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exchange rate system is a managed system that is largely controlled by the Chinese government. 
If a currency is managed to be kept artificially and persistently at a lower level than the level 
that would be generated competitively in markets, then current account balances will show 
persistent surpluses. 
 In addition, because China is a socialist market economy, strict regulations in financial 
and many other markets exist. International transactions are also strictly regulated so it is not a 
typical market-oriented economy. Demand and supply can be controlled by the government to 
some extent so they are not necessarily realized fully competitively through markets. Therefore, 
the current account balances of China may not necessarily correctly reflect competitive 
equilibria in markets. In particular, many regulations in China are designed to encourage exports 
and discourage imports of consumption goods. As a result, the persistently large current account 
surpluses may have been artificially generated.  
 State-owned enterprises are also dominant in the Chinese economy. Their activities are 
particularly important because investment makes up about 50% of China’s GDP (whereas 
consumption makes up only about 40% of GDP), and many investments are undertaken by 
state-owned enterprises. In many industrialized economies, in contrast, investment and 
consumption consist of about 20% and 60% of GDP, respectively.2 This feature implies that it 
is the state-owned enterprises and not households that are implementing the countermeasure 
through investments. They may purchase domestic investment goods to the extent possible and 
produce export goods without considering domestic household demand. Even if households 
dislike or complain about this behavior, they may be silenced by the Chinese government. In 
that sense, state-owned enterprises of China may be behaving “patriotically”, as discussed 
previously, and this will have the same effect as when households implement the 
countermeasure. As a result, persistently large current account surpluses may have been 
generated.  
 Whatever the reason for the creation of the surpluses, an important point is that the 
current account surpluses of China have generally been tolerated internationally. Some critics, 
however, and particularly those in the U.S., have criticized some of China’s actions as being 
unfair. That said, no severe international sanctions have been imposed on China, which may 
mean that China’s persistently large surpluses are implicitly regarded to be consistent with 
international sustainable heterogeneity.  
 
4.5  Current account balances in developing countries 
4.5.1  An insufficient countermeasure  
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, implementing the countermeasure indicates that rationality 
prevails over preference. Conversely, if rationality cannot sufficiently prevail over preference, 
the effect of the countermeasure will be limited. For example, country 2’s households may not 
resist buying goods and services even if they aware of the ensuing eventual non-optimal state. If 
the countermeasure is insufficient, the currency will not depreciate enough to stop the unilateral 
behavior of the households of country 1.  
 Productivities of developing countries are generally lower than those of developed 
countries, and their RTPs will therefore generally be higher. If a developing country’s 
countermeasure is insufficient, its current account balances will show accelerating deficits 
because sustainable heterogeneity has not been achieved.  
 
4.5.2  Borrowing from foreign countries 
If the government of country 2 (a developing country) borrows a huge amount of money from 
                                                          
2 United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp 
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country 1 (a developed country) in the currency of country 1, the government of country 2 will 
not want its currency to depreciate because depreciation will make it more expensive to pay 
back country 1 in the currency of country 1. Therefore, the government of country 2 may hinder 
its households from implementing the countermeasure. For example, the government (together 
with the central bank) of country 2 may keep interest rates much higher than usual to prevent 
the currency from depreciating. The households of country 1 can therefore behave unilaterally 
without anxiety, and households of country 2 have to endure eventual non-optimality. As a 
result, the current account balances of country 2 will show accelerating deficits. A default on the 
loan by the government of country 2 or debt forgiveness by country 1 may be the only practical 
ways to resolve the problem for country 2.   
 
4.5.3  The impact of regulation  
In most developed countries, many regulations in financial markets have been lifted or greatly 
reduced since the 1980s. Therefore, current account balances will basically reflect increasingly 
unbiased transactions among households and firms. However, in many developing countries, 
there are still strict regulations in essential economic activities and international transactions. As 
a result, current account balances as well as the behaviors of households and firms are biased by 
the regulations. Hence, the model predictions may not be clearly observed in the current account 
balances of those countries.  
 
4.5.4  Raw materials 
In many developing countries, the main exports are raw materials. An important feature of raw 
materials is large fluctuations in their international prices. Current account balances in countries 
whose main exports are raw materials are greatly affected by those fluctuations. When prices 
are relatively high, current account balances will generally show surpluses, but if prices fall, 
deficits will often be observed. Therefore, in such countries, the mechanism of the model may 
not be clearly distinguished in the current account balances.  
 Note that if a relatively small country can enjoy some kind of economic rent in a broad 
sense such as being oil-rich or having some geopolitical or tax advantages, the effect the model 
predicts will be also unclear in the current account balances regardless of whether it is a 
developing or developed country (e.g., Kuwait, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland). 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
If there is no sustainable heterogeneity across countries, current account balances should be 
stationary with a zero mean in any country. However, current account balances actually often 
show persistent deficits or surpluses in many countries. Some heterogeneity must have played 
an important role in these imbalances. Harashima (2009b, 2009c, 2010) showed that 
heterogeneity in preferences across countries can generate persistent current account imbalances 
at steady state and on a balanced growth path. Under sustainable heterogeneity, the current 
account balances of countries with relatively less patient or risk averse households show 
persisting deficits at steady state and on a balanced growth path and vice versa. However, 
sustainable heterogeneity is not naturally achieved. 
 Here, I have presented a mechanism by which international sustainable heterogeneity 
can be naturally achieved if exchange rates are allowed to float because of a countermeasure 
used by households in the less advantaged country. The countermeasure is to (1) reduce the 
overall level of consumption and (2) reduce the level of consumption of products imported from 
more advantaged countries relative to the initially expected amounts. With the implementation 
of the countermeasure, sustainable heterogeneity can be achieved and persistent current account 
deficits or surpluses are generated at a competitively achieved steady state (or balanced growth 
 12 
path). This countermeasure is the only feasible measure for less advantaged countries’ 
households to escape from a non-optimal state. Therefore, implementing this countermeasure is 
fully rational and optimal for households of less advantaged countries.  
 The observed persistent current account deficits or surpluses in recent decades in the 
world seem to be basically consistent with the predictions of the model with some notable 
exceptions.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A1  The model 
A1.1  The base model 
In this paper, sustainability of heterogeneity is examined in the framework of endogenous 
growth, but most endogenous growth models commonly have problems with scale effects or the 
influence of population growth (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b). Hence, this paper uses the model 
presented by Harashima (2010, 2013), which is free from both problems (see also Jones, 1995a; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002). The production function is tY  
 ttt LKAF ,, , and the accumulation of capital is 
 
tttt AνCYK
   ,                          (A1) 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is consumption, 
 0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1
 of a unit of At are equivalent: that is, they are 
produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are identical and have the same size, and 
for any period, 
 
t
t
L
M
m   ,                              (A2) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms, and  0m  is a constant. In addition,  
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 ;                         (A3) 
 
thus,  
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t
t
t
A
y
mνk
y




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                             (A4) 
 
is always kept, where yt is output per capita, kt is capital per capita, and  1  is a constant. 
For simplicity, the period of patent is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital depreciation is 
assumed.   indicates the effect of patent protection. With patents, the income is distributed to 
not only capitals and labors but technologies. Equation (A2) indicates that population and 
number of firms are positively correlated. Equations (A3) and (A4) indicate that returns on 
investing in Kt and in At are kept equal and that a firm that produces a new technology cannot 
obtain all the returns on an investment in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the 
investing firm’s return on the investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
   t
t
tt
t
t νA
Y
mLνA
Y
M 



 
 because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms and 
complementarity of technologies. 
 A part of the knowledge generated as a result of an investment made by a firm spills 
over to other firms. Researchers in firms as well as universities and research institutions could 
not effectively generate innovations if they were isolated from other researchers. They contact 
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and stimulate each other. Probably, mutual partial knowledge spillovers among researchers and 
firms give each other reciprocal benefits. Researchers take hints on their researches in exchange 
for spilled knowledge. Therefore, even though the investing firm wishes to keep its knowledge 
secret, some parts of it will spill over. In addition, many uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
occur because many technologies are regarded as so minor that they are not applied for patents 
and left unprotected by patents. Nevertheless, even if a technology that was generated as a 
byproduct is completely useless for the investing firm, it may be a treasure for firms in a 
different industry. At includes all these technologies, and an investment in technology generates 
many technologies that the investing firm cannot protect by patents.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; Marshall, 
1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Jacobs 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge spillovers between 
homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will therefore primarily emerge 
within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the 
number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that 
knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice different activities and that 
diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. 
Nevertheless, if all sectors have the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in 
the economy results in more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR 
externalities or Jacobs externalities. 
 Furthermore, as the volume of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases, the 
investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y


 indicates the total increase in Yt 
in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs in the firm that 
invested in the new technologies and outputs in other firms that utilize the newly invented 
technologies, whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm 
or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y


 
that the investing firm can obtain becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the 
investment in At also become smaller. 
 Complementarity of technologies also reduces the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing 
firm can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with some particular 
technologies, the return on the investment in technology will belong not only to the investing 
firm but to the firms that hold these particular technologies. For example, an innovation in 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that hold complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y


 leaks to these firms. For 
them, the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue unexpectedly become obtainable thanks to the 
innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. In addition, as the 
number of firms increases, the number of firms that holds complementary technologies will also 
increase, and thereby these leaks will also increase.  
 Because of the uncompensated knowledge spillovers and the complementarity of 
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technologies, therefore, the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that an investing firm can obtain on average will 
be comparatively small, i.e.,   will be far smaller than Mt except that Mt is very small,3 and 
the fraction will decrease as Mt increases.  
 The production function is specified as  tt
α
tt ,LKfAY   where α  10  α  is a 
constant. Let 
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A1.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are 
examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the model shown in 
Section A1.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and economy 2—that 
are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The population growth 
rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 
A1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed.4 The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is 
1θ  
and that in economy 2 is 
2θ , and 21 θθ  . The production function in economy 1 is 
 t
α
tt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  t
α
tt kfAy ,2,2  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2. The population of each 
economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
                                                          
3 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt, because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation can not be fully 
realized in the economy. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~     where  1~   is a constant. 
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such 
that      

~~11~lim 1
t
t
M
M
. 
4 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous time preference was originally shown by Harashima 
(2009b). 
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economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is tτ  and 
that in economy 2 is 
tτ . Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral 
technological progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
ti,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,,   iLAKY
α
tt
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. 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
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Equation (A5) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that 
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Because equation (A5) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
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In addition, because 
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held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 
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income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
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is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkgτ 21  . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
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and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
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where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,
 , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and 
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . Equations (A6) and (A7) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because 
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Because 
tL  is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby 
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 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
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Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
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A1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that of 
heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion.5 The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
1
11
1   and that of 
                                                          
5 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous risk aversion was originally shown by Harashima 
(2009c). 
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economy 2 is 
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2  , which are constant, and 21 εε  . The optimization problem of 
economy 1 is 
 
    dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
11
 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 1
0
1
11 11 











 
   , 
 
and that of economy 2 is 
 
    dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
22
 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 2
0
1
22 11 











 
   . 
 
A1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the utility 
function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous production 
function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) argues that 
unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous 
across countries. Harashima (2009a) argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an 
essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they 
can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit all 
the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. Furthermore, 
innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. A 
production function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009a), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
 1  ,                       (A8) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
productivity that is represented by α
tLA Aωωσ  in equation (A8) is heterogeneous between the 
two economies. The production function of economy 1 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 111   and that of 
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Because equation (A5) is always held through arbitration, equations 
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 Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt and thus 
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and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
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A2  Sustainability of heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. Although the previously discussed state of 
Becker (1980) is Pareto efficient, by this definition, the heterogeneity is not sustainable because 
only the most patient household can achieve optimality. Sustainability is therefore the stricter 
criterion for welfare than Pareto efficiency. 
 In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is examined. First, 
the basic natures of the models presented in Section A1 are examined and then sustainability is 
examined. 
 
A2.1  The consumption growth rate 
A2.1.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
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where 
tλ1  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 1 are 
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Similarly, let Hamiltonian H2 be 
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where 
tλ 2  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 2 are 
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By equations (A10), (A11), and (A12), the consumption growth rate in economy 1 is 
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and by equations (A14), (A15), and (A16), that in economy 2 is 
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is satisfied.  
 
A2.1.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
By using similar procedures as were used with the heterogeneous time preference model, the 
consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
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and that in economy 2 is 
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A constant growth rate such that 
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is satisfied.  
 
A2.1.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
By similar procedures, the consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
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and that in economy 2 is 
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A constant growth rate such that 
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is satisfied.  
 
A2.2  Transversality conditions 
A2.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Transversality conditions are satisfied if the following conditions are satisfied. 
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and 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
A2.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 
Lemma 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, unless 1lim
,1
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
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t
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, 
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A2.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
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 In all three models, the occurrence of 1lim
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discussion. 
 
A2.3  Sustainability 
Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the following analyses 
focus on the steady state such that 
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A2.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the following 
properties. 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
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Hence, by Lemma 1-1, the transversality conditions are satisfied while all the other optimality 
conditions are also satisfied. 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
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by equations (A18) and (A19). 
 
Corollary 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
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Proof: By Lemma 2-1, 
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Corollary 1-1, equation (A30) holds.                                             ■ 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, consumption, 
and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account balance to output, 
consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown in the proof of Proposition 
1-1; that is, Ξ
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 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1, 
heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced growth path satisfying 
Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1 is called the “multilateral balanced growth path” or 
(more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the following discussion. The term “multilateral” is 
used even though there are only two economies, because the two-economy models shown can 
easily be extended to the multi-economy models shown in Section A2.6.  
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is examined in the following discussion. 
 
A2.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
On the multilateral path in the heterogeneous risk aversion model, the same Proposition, 
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On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-2 and Corollaries 1-2 and 2-2, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is also sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied, and this path is the multilateral path. 
 
A2.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
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 By Lemma 2-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, either  
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Proposition 1-3: If and only if 
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Corollary 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 
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On the two balanced growth paths satisfying Proposition 1-3 and Corollaries 1-3 and 2-3, 
heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable by definition because all the optimality conditions of 
the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
 By equations (A24) and (A25), the limit of the growth rate on these sustainable paths 
is 
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A2.4  The balance of payments 
A2.4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1-1, Ξ
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 on the multilateral path. Because ki,t is positive, if the sign of Ξ 
is negative, the current account of economy 1 will eventually show permanent deficits and vice 
versa. 
 
Lemma 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
Lemma 3-1 indicates that the value of Ξ is uniquely determined on the multilateral path, and the 
sign of Ξ is also therefore uniquely determined. 
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Proposition 2-1 indicates that the current account deficit of economy 1 and the current account 
surplus of economy 2 continue indefinitely on the multilateral path. The condition 
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 Conversely, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
Corollary 3-1 indicates that, on the multilateral path, the trade surpluses of economy 1 continue 
indefinitely and vice versa. That is, goods and services are transferred from economy 1 to 
economy 2 in each period indefinitely in exchange for the returns on the accumulated current 
account deficits (i.e., debts) of economy 1. 
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of economy 1 is not a surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary 3-1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
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continues to be a deficit. After a sufficient negative amount of dsτ
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s0  is accumulated, the trade 
balances of economy 1 shift to surpluses. 
 
A2.4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
Similarly, the value of Ξ in the heterogeneous risk aversion model is uniquely determined on the 
multilateral path. 
 
Lemma 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 
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Proposition 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0Ξ  if 
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Corollary 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0lim
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 By Lemma 3-2 and equations (A21) and (A22), the limit of the growth rate on the 
multilateral path is  
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A2.4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
As Lemma 2-3 shows, on the multilateral path, either 0lim 
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thus, Ξ explodes to infinity. Hence, the latter path will generally not be selected. The question of 
which path is selected is examined in detail in Section A3.3. 
 
A2.5  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
The three heterogeneities are not exclusive. It is particularly likely that heterogeneities in time 
preference and productivity coexist. Many empirical studies conclude that the rate of time 
preference is negatively correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 
2003); this indicates that the economy with the higher productivity has a lower rate of time 
preference and vice versa. In this section, the models are extended to include heterogeneity in 
multiple elements. 
 Suppose that economies 1 and 2 are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, 
and productivity. The Hamiltonian for economy 1 is 
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and that for economy 2 is 
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The growth rates are 
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and 
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and the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is 
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 as shown in Sections 
A2.3 and A2.4. 
 The sign of Ξ on the multilateral path depends on the relative values between θ1 and θ2, 
ε1 and ε2, and ω1 and ω2. Nevertheless, if the rate of time preference and productivity are 
negatively correlated, as argued above (i.e., if 
21 θθ   and 21 ωω   while 21 εε  ), then by 
similar proofs as those presented for Proposition 2-1 and Corollary 3-1, if 
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on the multilateral path; that is, the current account deficits and trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely. The condition 
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satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 
A2.6  Multi-economy models 
The two-economy models can be extended to include numerous economies that have differing 
degrees of heterogeneity.  
 
A2.6.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Suppose that there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. Let θi be the 
rate of time preference of economy i and tjiτ ,,  be the current account balance of economy i 
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with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. Because the total population is 
Lt, the population in each economy is 
H
Lt . The representative household of economy i 
maximizes its expected utility  
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for i ≠ j. 
 
Proposition 3-1: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and  
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
A2.6.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The heterogeneous risk aversion model can be extended to the multi-economy model by a proof 
similar to that for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for risk 
aversion, and their degrees of risk aversion are εi (i = 1, 2, … , H). 
 
Proposition 3-2: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
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state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
A2.6.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
The heterogeneous productivity model can also be extended by a proof similar to that for 
Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for productivity, and their 
productivities are ωi (i = 1, 2, … , H). Note that, because  tk ,21  
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Proposition 3-3: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
A2.6.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
Similarly, the multi-economy model can be extended to heterogeneity in multiple elements, as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 3-4: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneity in multiple elements, if and only 
if  
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for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
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satisfied at steady state, and 
 




t
sji
t
sji
t
tji
tji
t
t
t
t
ti
ti
t
ti
ti
t
ti
ti
t
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
A
A
y
y
k
k
c
c
0
,,
0
,,
,,
,,
,
,
,
,
,
, limlimlimlimlimlim

  
 
for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
 Proposition 3-4 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral path. 
 
A2.7  Degeneration to an exogenous technology model 
The multilateral paths in the endogenous growth models imply that similar sustainable states 
exist in exogenous technology models. However, this is true only for the heterogeneous time 
preference model, because, in exogenous technology models, the steady state means that 
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. Thereby, only heterogeneous time preference is relevant to sustainable 
heterogeneity in exogenous growth models. 
 If technology is exogenously given and constant (At = A), Hamiltonians for the 
heterogeneous time preference model shown in Section A1.2.1 degenerate to  
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By equations (A10), (A11), and (A12), the growth rate of consumption in economy 1 is 
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constant at steady state, it is necessary that 0lim 
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If equation (A35) holds, all the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely 
satisfied. This result is analogous to equation (A29) and corresponds to the multilateral path in 
the endogenous growth models. The state indicated by equation (A35) is called the “multilateral 
steady state” in the following discussion. 
 If both economies are not open and are isolated, 
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 at steady state instead of the conditions shown in equation (A35). Hence, at the 
multilateral steady state with 
21 θθ  , the amount of capital in economy 1 is smaller than when 
the economy is isolated and vice versa. As a result, output and consumption in economy 1 are 
also smaller in the multilateral steady state with 
21 θθ   than when the economy is isolated. 
Furthermore, 
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
 
  dsτkAα
t
s
α
t
α


0
,11  
 
in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. 
 In the multilateral steady state, all the optimality conditions of both economies are 
satisfied, and heterogeneity is therefore sustainable. However, this state will be economically 
less preferable for economy 1 as compared with the state of Becker (1980), because 
consumption is smaller and debts are owed. Which state should economy 1 select? A similar 
dilemma―whether to give priority to simultaneous optimality with economy 2 or to unilaterally 
optimal higher utility―will also arise in the endogenous growth models; this is examined in the 
following sections. 
 
A3  Unilateral balanced growth 
The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not mean that the two 
economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that, 
under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth 
models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy in general, except in the special case that all agents have the same constant 
rate of time preference. How the economies behave in the environments described in Sections 
A1 and A2 is examined in this section. 
 
A3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions of economy 1 
are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but economy 2 
cannot. 
 
Lemma 4-1: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
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at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
 
t
t
t
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t c
c
ds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlim














                (A36) 
 
or 
 
 41 
  α
α
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
α
mν
α
ds
dt
dsd

















1
0
0
1limlim




   .           (A37) 
 
That is, 
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 can be constant only when either equation (A36) or (A37) is satisfied. 
Conversely, economy 1 has two paths on which all its optimality conditions are satisfied. 
Equation (A36) indicates that 
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. Equation (A36) corresponds to the 
multilateral path. On the path satisfying equation (A37), 
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economy 2 must initially set consumption such that 02,c , which violates the optimality 
condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the optimality 
conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation (A37) even though 
those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality 
conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path satisfying equation (A37) is called 
the “unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral path” in the following discussion. 
Clearly, heterogeneity in time preference is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
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The reasoning behind Remark 1-1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral path and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 4-1 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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conditions of both economies cannot be satisfied. Since 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
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almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set 02,c  to satisfy all its 
optimality conditions, as the proof of Lemma 4-1 indicates. Setting 02,c  is impossible, but 
economy 2 as the follower will initially set 
,tc2  as large as possible. This action gives economy 
2 a higher expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the 
second case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as 
possible from economy 1, and the trade deficit of economy 2 continues until 
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account deficits and the accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. 
Furthermore, they will increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
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disturbance occurs, the expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes 
extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, 
economy 2 will lose all its capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result 
corresponds to the state shown by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. 
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condition for economy 1 is satisfied by Lemma 1-1. Thus, all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 are satisfied if economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
A3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The same consequences are observed in this model. 
 
Lemma 4-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality conditions of both 
economies cannot be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
A3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Unlike the heterogeneous preferences shown in Sections A3.1 and A3.2, heterogeneity in 
productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 
Lemma 4-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, it is possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both economies are satisfied if 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
 All the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation 
(A31) or (A32) holds, because 
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 can be constant only when equation (A31) or (A32) 
holds. Equation (A31) corresponds to the multilateral path, and equation (A32) corresponds to 
the unilateral path. Unlike the heterogeneity in preferences, Lemma 4-3 shows that, even on the 
unilateral path, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied because the limit of 
both economies’ growth rates is identical on the path of either equation (A31) or (A32), such 
that 
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,1  . Therefore, heterogeneity in productivity is 
sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
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 Nevertheless, on the unilateral path, current account imbalances generally grow 
steadily at a higher rate than consumption; this is not the case on the multilateral path. How does 
economy 1 set τ? If economy 1 imports as many goods and services as possible before reaching 
the steady state at which 
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t
t
), the expected utility of economy 1 will be 
higher than it is in either case where 0tτ  or in the multilateral path. However, the debts 
economy 1 owes to economy 2 will grow indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption, and the 
ratio of debt to consumption explodes to infinity. If there is no disturbance, this situation will be 
sustained forever, but economy 1 will become extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative 
disturbance. Hence, the unilateral path will not necessarily be favorable for economy 1 although 
all its optimality conditions are satisfied on this path, and economy 1 will prefer the multilateral 
path. 
 
Remark 1-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even though economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the multilateral balanced growth path will be selected. 
 
Hence, the state shown by Becker (1980) will not be observed in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity.  
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